9. Legitimation Strategies of Parapsychologists
It
may be argued that the emphasis on conventional hypotheses is a strategy some
parapsychologists have used to legitimize our field. Whether or not this is
true, it is important to be aware of the strategies parapsychologists have used
to establish their field, in addition to our understanding of their research
efforts, as McClenon (1982) has said. In fact, legitimizing strategies are the
internal means that researchers use to render the field more acceptable in the
face of so much criticism. One of these devices relates to the way our current
research or concerns are depicted in light of our past. Sometimes our current
work is validated by comparing it to previous work, even to the extent of
distorting the record. An example here is the way in which
J. B. Rhine and
Louisa E. Rhine discussed the work they conducted while they were at Duke
University. In one of her papers L. E. Rhine (1967) argued that it was only
during the modern period that ESP was established enough so as to be used as an
alternative explanation for mediumistic communications, something that could not
be done in the 1920s. But as I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Alvarado,
2003), ESP explanations were certainly taken seriously in the old days. Such a
point of view was clearly not a development coming only from the experimental
work conducted by the Rhines and their associates. Another example: both J. B.
and Louisa Rhine argued that the unconscious nature of ESP only became evident
because of experimental work conducted during the 1940s (J. B. Rhine, 1977; L.
E. Rhine, 1971). While it is true that this work may have supported the idea,
the concept that psi is an unconscious function had been clearly articulated
before the Duke work, as can be seen in Myers's (1903) work. But the Rhines
discussed the idea as if it had been an original invention coming out of their
work, possibly to enhance the importance of the developments related to the Duke
work. The reinvention of concepts and the rewriting of history have been
important in the construction of a modern identity for parapsychologists.
Another way psychical researchers have traditionally tried to deal with their
phenomena has been to draw analogies to other processes of the physical world.
The purpose here has been to show that psychic functioning is part of the
natural world (on the use of metaphors see Williams & Dutton,
1998). The concept
of physical and biological radiations has been applied throughout the history of
mesmerism, Spiritualism, and psychical research to explain ESP, PK, healing,
materializations, and other phenomena. In his recent history of telepathy Luckhurst (2002, pp. 75-92) chronicled some of the early attempts to present
this phenomenon as a force of nature similar to light, electricity and
magnetism. Early exponents of this movement included
William Barrett, who
speculated of telepathy's similarity to electrical induction (1876), and
William
Crookes, who drew an analogy with such radiations as X rays (1897). Invocation
of the analogies to radio (Warcollier, 1938) also served this function.
The use of value-free terminology has been another method by which we have
attempted to legitimize our field (on terminology in general see Zingrone and
Alvarado,
1987). Call it anomalous cognition, delta-afferentation,
extrasensory
perception, paranormal cognition, or ultra perceptive faculty, the attempt here
has been to present a scientific sounding and sometimes theory-free term. But
terms have been used on purpose to emphasize particular views as well. To refer
to processes which transcend the physical world while at the same time interact
with it Myers (1903) gave us such terms as metheterial, psychical invasion, and
psychorrhagy. Richet's (1922) crypthesthesia, Sudre's (1926) prosopopesis and
Roll and Pratt's recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis (Pratt & Roll, 1958) were
designed to separate the conceptualization of our phenomena from spiritual
connotations. In the past other terms have been proposed to separate the field
from the occult and from Spiritualism. This seems to have been
Charles Richet's
(1905) intention (at least in part) when he introduced the term metapsychics to
refer to psychical research. Later on
William McDougall (1937) adopted and
redefined the term parapsychology from the German literature to differentiate
the field from psychical research with its traditional study of mediums and
spontaneous cases. He used parapsychology to refer to "the more strictly
experimental part of the whole field implied by psychical research" (p. 7).
On other occasions it seems that the use of new terms is believed to be of help
in the acceptance of our work because they separate the writer, albeit
temporarily and superficially, from the parapsychological tradition. Possible
examples of this are such terms as remote viewing and anomalous cognition. This
attempt to disconnect the work from parapsychology is sometimes seen in the use
of neutral names for our organizations. Some past and present examples of this
strategy are:
Division of Personality Studies,
Laboratories for Fundamental
Research, Mind Science Foundation, Science Research Unlimited, and
Psychophysical Research Laboratories. On occasion, both in private and in print
(Honnegger,
1982, p. 22; Honorton, 1976, p. 218), there have been suggestions to
drop the "Parapsychological" out of the name of the PA. There is no question
that there may be advantages to this strategy, an important one being
facilitating the acquisition of grant money. While the latter may work for a
while, I believe once the outside world knows that we are dealing with the same
old ESP and PK and with other traditionally parapsychological phenomena, we will
be in the same position because we may be perceived as trying to deceive
mainstream science by camouflaging parapsychology in the protective coloring of
a neutral name. While there may be associations with traditional
parapsychological terminology that range from the controversial to the
sensational and unacceptable, the main issue is the implications others perceive
in our claims.
Another strategy to obtain credibility is to show the outside world that we are
aware of alternative explanations of psychic phenomena. While this is part of
normal scientific discourse, it also projects a good image of our critical
abilities, something that is particularly useful when one is identified with
parapsychology professionally. In fact, one can find this in some of the
classics of parapsychology. Much space was devoted to the problems with human
testimony and consideration of chance coincidences in Phantasms of the Living
(Gurney, Myers &
Podmore, 1886, Vol. 1, Chapter 4, Vol. 2, Chapter 13).
Similarly, in his 1934 monograph Extra-Sensory Perception, J. B. Rhine (1934,
Chapter 9) devoted sections to alternative explanations, if only to counter
them. Later examples included Robert Tocquet's (1970/1973, pp. 147-149, 219-227)
discussion of fraudulent miraculous healings and stigmata and
Ian Stevenson's
(1975, pp. 18-44) analysis of sources of error in the study of
reincarnation-type cases.
I became aware of the rhetorical value of writing about fraud and other normal
explanations while I was crafting a paper published 16 years ago on luminous
phenomena around mediums, mystics, saints and other individuals (Alvarado,
1987). I knew I was writing about a topic that was rare and unconventional, even
among parapsychologists, and I was worried about the reception of the paper.
While a section on fraud and other normal explanations should always be part of
examinations of cases such as the ones I discussed, including that section was
also a strategy to establish credibility.
More recently, Robert Morris has devoted much time to what looks psychic but is
not. I believe that Morris's success in revitalizing parapsychology in academic
circles in Great Britain (Smith,
1999) comes to some extent from this strategy
of showing the world of psychology that he is aware of a wide range of pitfalls
in behavioral research, not to mention some that are specific to parapsychology
(Morris, 1986; see also Wiseman & Morris,
1995).
Another way in which we try to enhance our credibility as scientists is by
confining most of our efforts to such conservative phenomena as ESP. A quick
look at the research papers presented at the last four PA conventions
(2000-2003) shows that the preferred research topic of PA members was ESP (see
Table 1, below). Much less attention was paid to PK or to OBEs, mediumship, hauntings,
or poltergeists. Certainly scientists have to focus their efforts in order to
make advances. In some ways this process started in modern parapsychology with
J. B. Rhine's (1934) monograph Extrasensory Perception, in which, while
discussing a classificatory scheme of psychic phenomena, Rhine reduced
parapsychology to ESP. Regardless of the scientific reasons for this strategy,
the fact is that traditionally modern parapsychology has focused most of its
efforts on ESP and has neglected a wide variety of other phenomena, even if they
can be related to ESP when one speculates on their mechanisms. While such a
strategy has focused our research, it has also limited our knowledge of the
variety of experiences people report. We know much less than we should about
other psychic experiences, their impact on people, and their relation to mental
health concerns, among other issues. So we have paid for our strategy of
limiting the range of topics studied (Alvarado,
1996c).
TABLE 1
Topics of Research Papers at Recent Parapsychological Association
Conventions
2000-2003 (N=63) |
Topic |
N |
% |
Experiments |
ESP |
38 |
60.3 |
PK/DMILS[a] |
9 |
14.3 |
Spontaneous Cases |
Variety of psychic experiences[b] |
9 |
14.3 |
Hauntings |
2 |
3.2 |
NDEs |
1 |
1.6 |
Recollections of previous lives |
1 |
1.6 |
Apparitions |
1 |
1.6 |
Poltergeists |
1 |
1.6 |
Mediumship |
1 |
1.6 |
[a]
Some of these may be classified as ESP.
[b] These are questionnaire studies considering a variety of experiences (e.g.,
waking and dream ESP, OBEs).
In addition to a strategic separation from specific phenomena there is also a
tendency among some of us to want to drop survival research in general from the
agenda of parapsychology. There have always been attempts to disconnect survival
from parapsychology for a variety of reasons. Réne Sudre (1951) argued that
survival was not demonstrated by the facts and that it was a topic outside the
scope of science, part of the "inaccessible refuge of religious beliefs" (p.
389, my translation). George Zorab (1983) had a similar view when he referred to
survival research as the "forlorn quest." Because survival is so difficult to
test for scientifically, several figures in the field - such as J. B. Rhine
(1974), Gerd Hövelmann (1983) and Harvey J. Irwin (2002) - have branded the
subject as untestable and consequently an unproductive area of research. While
this may be debated by arguing that there are ways to investigate difficult
topics if one follows approaches or analyses that are more subtle than those
providing a simple "yes" or "no" decision on the testability issue (e.g.,
Braude,
2003), I am concerned here with views that see interest in survival as a
contaminant in the quest to be seen as scientific. The most recent example is
Irwin's (2002) statement that interest in survival may "compromise ... the
standing of parapsychological research as a legitimate scientific endeavour" (p.
25). This position, however, is problematic and should not satisfy most
parapsychologists because similar political concerns have affected and are still
affecting the whole field of parapsychology in terms of its relationship to
psychology.
We would do well to consider that such conservative attitudes are in the eye of
the beholder and that, consequently, demarcation strategies flow in different
directions. While some parapsychologists may feel that interest and research on
survival contaminate their more elegant and controlled work that follows from
physics or psychology, we need to be aware that others have similarly dismissed
parapsychology in general whether or not they perceive survival research to be
part of the enterprise. Psychologists, as Deborah Coon (1992) has argued, have a
long history of trying to separate their field from the general public's
conception that psychic phenomena are studied by psychologists. A good
historical example of this was American psychologist Joseph Jastrow's comments
in his book Fact and Fable in Psychology, published in 1900. He wrote:
Pernicious is the distorted conception, which the prominence of Psychical
Research has scattered broadcast, of the purposes and methods of Psychology. The
status of that science has suffered, its representatives have been
misunderstood, its advancement has been hampered, its appreciation by the public
at large has been weakened and wrongly estimated, by reason of the popularity of
the unfortunate aspects of Psychical Research, and of its confusion with them (Jastrow,
1900, pp. 75-76).
Attempts to separate out work from specific phenomena and topics present a
multitude of agendas and self-interests. So while some of our own shun specific
areas of the field because they want their own areas to appear more scientific,
others outside the field do the same thing to the whole discipline. As Michael
Winkelman (1982) has said, "Academia's failure to include parapsychology is
mirrored in parapsychology's failure to respond in a responsible manner to the
general population's concern with the areas popularly referred to as occult" (p.
15).
It is regrettable that we feel that we need to deny parts of out subject matter
for political purposes, especially when the most conservative experimental ESP
studies are similarly disregarded by others outside the field. In our efforts to
be accepted, we have become worse than our critics, we have dissociated
ourselves from some part of the basic claims of our field by employing the
strategy of denial used by outside critics. It is almost as if our traumatic
experiences with criticism and rejection have forced us to excise parts of out
nature in order to be acceptable to outsiders, and to ourselves. As with other
types of traumatic experiences, such defense mechanisms are not necessarily
completely conscious nor are they adaptive. By abandoning traditions, areas and
problems we are merely turning our backs on important issues, and we are
condemning ourselves and everyone else to ignorance on questions that may be of
great importance.
As I have argued before, and here I am referring to issues and phenomena not
necessarily connected to survival,[7] we should research such problems so as to
increase our empirical knowledge of neglected issues (Alvarado,
1996c; Alvarado
& Zingrone, 1996). It is true that some problems obtain more attention than
others because they are more easily testable and that some research programs are
more productive or progressive than others. But not everything that is important
is easily testable. After all, parapsychology has traditionally been about the
hard problems. Let us form our identity as parapsychologists not through
artificial prescriptions of neglect or demarcation, but by attempts to study
systematically any relevant problem the best way we can. The combined knowledge
of the behavioral and natural sciences has enough methodologies to study any
problem scientifically and critically. This is not to say we are capable of
testing or measuring anything we want, but we can at the very least try to learn
something about the features and correlates of all the phenomena that fall into
our purview. Let us not be conservative at the expense of knowledge.
[7]
This may include controversial and dramatic phenomena such as auras,
materializations and religious miracles.
Next part: 10. When
Parapsychologists Harm Their Cause
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